Sunday, August 15, 2010

Common Law

The term is of English origin and is used to describe the juridical principles and general rules regulating the possession, use and inheritance of property and the conduct of individuals, the origin of which is not definitely known, which have been observed since a remote period of antiquity, and which are based upon immemorial usages and the decisions of the law courts as distinct from the lex scripta; the latter consisting of imperial or kingly edicts or express acts of legislation. That pre-eminent English lawyer and law-writer, Sir William Blackstone, states in his "Commentaries upon the Laws of England" that the common law consists of rules properly called leges non scriptœ, because their original institution and authority were not set down in writing as Acts of Parliament are, but they receive their binding power and the force of laws by long immemorial usage, and by their universal reception throughout the kingdom; and, quoting from a famous Roman author, Aulus Gellius, he follows him in defining the common law as did Gellius the Jus non scriptum  as that which is "tacito illiterato hominum consensu et moribus expressum" (expressed in the usage of the people, and accepted by the tacit unwritten consent of men).

When a community emerges from the tribal condition into that degree of social development which constitutes a state and, consequently, the powers of government become defined with more or less distinctness as legislative, executive, and judicial, and the arbitration of disputes leads to the establishment of courts, the community finds itself conscious of certain rules regarding the conduct of life, the maintenance of liberty, and the security of property which come into being at the very twilight of civilization and have been consistently observed from age to age. Such were the usages and customs, having the force of law which became the inheritance of the English people and were first compiled and recorded by Alfred the Great in his famous "Dome-book" or "Liber Judicialis", published by him for the general use of the whole kingdom. That famous depository of laws was referred to in a certain declaration of King Edward, the son of Alfred, with the injunction: "Omnibus qui reipublicæ præsunt etiam atque etiam mando ut omnibus æquos se præbeant judices, perinde ac in judiciali libro scriptum habetur: nec quicquam formident quin jus commune audacter libereque dicant" (To all who are charged with the administration of public affairs I give the express command that they show themselves in all things to be just judges precisely as in the Liber Judicialis it is written; nor shall any of them fear to declare the common law freely and courageously).

In modern times the existence of the "Liber Judicialis" was the subject of great doubt, and such doubt was expressed by many writers upon the constitutional history of England, including both Hallam and Turner. After their day the manuscript of the work was brought to light and was published both in Saxon and English by the Record Commissioners of England in the first volume of the books published by them under the title, "The Ancient Laws and Institutes of England". The profound religious spirit which governed King Alfred and his times clearly appears from the fact that the "Liber Judicialis" began with the Ten Commandments, followed by many of the Mosaic precepts, added to which is the express solemn sanction given to them by Christ in the Gospel: "Do not think that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets; I am not come to destroy but to fulfil." After quoting the canons of the Apostolic Council at Jerusalem, Alfred refers to the Divine commandment, "As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them", and then declares, "From this one doom, a man may remember that he judge every one righteously, he need heed no other doom-book." The original code of the common law compiled by Alfred was modified by reason of the Danish invasion, and from other causes, so that when the eleventh century began the common law of England was not uniform but consisted of observances of different nature prevailing in various districts, viz: Mercen Lage, or Mercian laws governing many of the midland counties of England and those bordering upon Wales, the country to which the ancient Britons had retreated at the time of the Anglo-Saxon invasion. These laws were, probably, influenced by and intermixed with the British or Druidical customs. Another distinct code was the West-Saxon Lage (Laws of the West-Saxons) governing counties in the southern part of England from Kent to Devonshire. This was, probably, identical for the most part with the code which was edited and published by Alfred. The wide extent of the Danish conquest is shown by the fact that the Dane Lage, or Danish law, was the code which prevailed in the rest of the midland counties and, also, on the eastern coast. These three systems of law were codified and digested by Edward the Confessor into one system, which was promulgated throughout the entire kingdom and was universally observed. Alfred is designated by early historians as Legum Anglicanarum Conditor; Edward the Confessor as Legum Anglicanarum Restitutor.

In the days of the Anglo-Saxon kings the courts of justice consisted principally of the county courts. These county courts were presided over by the bishop of the diocese and the ealdorman or sheriff, sitting en banc and exercising both ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction. In these courts originated and developed the custom of trial by jury. Prior to the invasion led by William the Norman, the common law of England provided for the descent of lands to all the males without any right of primogeniture. Military service was required in proportion to the area of each free man's land, a system resembling the feudal system but not accompanied by all its hardships. Penalties for crime were moderate; few capital punishments being inflicted and persons convicted of their first offence being allowed to commute it for a fine or weregild; or in default of payment, by surrendering themselves to life-long bondage. The legal system which thus received form under the direction of the last Saxon King of England, was common to all the realm and was designated as "Jus commune" or Folk-right.

In contradistinction to English jurisprudence the Civil Law of Rome prevailed throughout the Continent. William the Conqueror brought with him into England jurists and clerics thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the civil law and distinctly adverse to the English system. However, the ancient laws and customs of England prevailing before the Conquest, withstood the shock and stress of opposition and remained without impairment to any material extent. The first great court of judicature in England after the Conquest was the Aula Regis or King's Court wherein the king either personally or constructively administered justice for the whole kingdom. The provision in Magna Charta to the effect that the King's Court of Justice should remain fixed and hold its sessions in one certain place, instead of being a peripatetic institution, constitutes historic evidence of the existence of such a court and, also, gives expression to the public discontent created by the fact that its sessions were held at various places and thus entailed great expense and trouble upon litigants. In later days, the Aula Regis became obsolete and its functions were divided between the three great common-law courts of the realm, viz; the Court of King's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of Exchequer. The Court of King's Bench was considered the highest of these three tribunals, although an appeal might be taken from the decisions thereof to the House of Lords. The Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction over ordinary civil actions, while the Court of Exchequer was restricted in its jurisdiction to causes affecting the royal revenues. Besides these courts the canon law was administered by the Catholic clergy of England in certain ecclesiastical courts called "Curiæ Christianitatis" or Courts Christian. These courts were presided over by the archbishop and bishops and their derivative officers. The canon law at an early date laid down the rule that "Sacerdotes a regibus honorandi sunt, non judicandi," i.e. the clergy are to be honoured by kings, but not to be judged by them, based on the tradition that when some petitions were brought to the Emperor Constantine, imploring the aid of his authority against certain of his bishops accused of oppression and injustice, he caused the petitions to be burned in their presence bidding them farewell in these words, "Ite et inter vos causas vestras discutite, quia dignum non est ut nos judicemus deos" (judge your own cases; it is not meet that we should judge sacred men).

The ecclesiastical courts of England were:

   1. The Archdeacon's Court which was the lowest in point of jurisdiction in the whole ecclesiastical polity. It was held by the archdeacon or, in his absence, before a judge appointed by him and called his official. Its jurisdiction was sometimes in concurrence with and sometimes in exclusion of the Bishop's Court of the diocese, and the statute 24 Henr. VIII, c. XII, provided for an appeal to the court presided over by the bishop.
   2. The Consistory Court of the diocesan bishop which held its sessions at the bishop's see for the trial of all ecclesiastical causes arising within the diocese. The bishop's chancellor, or his commissary, was the ordinary judge; and from his adjudication an appeal lay to the archbishop of the province.
   3. The Court of Arches was a court of appeal belonging to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the judge of such court was called the Dean of the Arches because in ancient times he held court in the church of St. Mary le bow (Sancta Maria de arcubus), one of the churches of London.
   4. The Court of Peculiars was a branch of and annexed to the Court of Arches. It had jurisdiction over all those parishes dispersed throughout the Province of Canterbury in the midst of other dioceses, which were exempt from the ordinary's jurisdiction and subject to the metropolitan only. All ecclesiastical causes arising within these peculiar or exempt jurisdictions were, originally, cognizable by this court. From its decisions an appeal lay, formerly, to the pope, but during the reign of Henry VIII this right of appeal was abolished by statute and therefor was substituted an appeal to the king in Chancery.
   5. The Prerogative Court was established for the trial of testamentary causes where the deceased had left "bona notabilia" (i.e. chattels of the value of at least one hundred shillings) within two different dioceses. In that case, the probate of wills belonged to the archbishop of the province, by way of special prerogative, and all causes relating to the wills, administrations or legacies of such persons were, originally, cognizable therein before a judge appointed by the archbishop and called the Judge of the Prerogative Court. From this court an appeal lay (until 25 Henr. VIII, c. XIX) to the pope; and after that to the king in Chancery.

These were the ancient courts. After the religious revolution had been inaugurated in England by Henry VIII, a sixth ecclesiastical court was created by that monarch and designated the Court of Delegates (judices delegati), and such delegates were appointed by the king's commission under his great seal, issuing out of chancery, to represent his royal person and to hear ordinary ecclesiastical appeals brought before him by virtue of the statute which has been mentioned as enacted in the twenty-fifth year of his reign. This commission was frequently filled with lords, spiritual and temporal, and its personnel was always composed in part of judges of the courts at Westminster and of Doctors of the Civil Law. Supplementary to these courts were certain proceedings under a special tribunal called a Commission of Review, which was appointed in extraordinary cases to revise the sentences of the Court of Delegates; and, during the reign of Elizabeth, another court was created, called the Court of the King's High Commission in Cases Ecclesiastical. This court was created in order to supply the place of the pope's appellate jurisdiction in regard to causes appertaining to the reformation, ordering and correcting of the ecclesiastical state and of ecclesiastical persons "and all manner of errors, heresies, schisms, abuses, offences, contempts and enormities". This court was the agent by which most oppressive acts were committed and was justly abolished by statute, 16 Car. I, c. XI. An attempt was made to revive it during the reign of King James II.

The Church of England was the name given to that portion of the laity and clergy of the Catholic Church resident in England during the days of the Anglo-Saxon monarchy and during the history of England under William the Conqueror and his successors down to the time when Henry VIII assumed unto himself the position of spiritual and temporal head of the English Church. Prior to the time of Henry VIII, the Church of England was distinctly and avowedly a part of the Church universal. Its prerogatives and its constitution were wrought into the fibre of the common law. Its ecclesiastical courts were recognized by the common law — the jus publicum of the kingdom — and clear recognition was accorded to the right of appeal to the sovereign pontiff; thus practically making the pontiff the supreme judge for England as he was for the remainder of Christendom in all ecclesiastical causes. The civil courts rarely sought to trench upon the domain of ecclesiastical affairs and conflict arose only when the temporalities of the church were brought within the scope of litigation. The common law is chiefly, however, to be considered in reference to its protection of purely human interests. As such it proved to be powerful, efficient and imposing. The Court of King's Bench, Common Pleas and the Exchequer, together with the High Court of Chancery, were justly famous throughout Christendom. The original Anglo-Saxon juridical system offered none but simple remedies comprehended, for the most part, in the award of damages for any civil wrong and in the delivery to the proper owners of land or chattels wrongfully withheld. Titles of an equitable nature were not recognized and there was no adequate remedy for the breach of such titles. The prevention of wrong by writs of injunction was unknown.

The idea of a juridical restoration of conditions which had been disturbed by wrongful act as well as the idea of enforcing the specific performance of contracts had never matured into either legislation or judicial proceedings. Such deficiencies in the jurisprudence of the realm were gradually supplied, under the Norman kings, by the royal prerogative exercised through the agency of the lord chancellor by special adjudications based upon equitable principles. In the course of time, a great Court of Chancery came into being deriving its name from the fact that its presiding judge was the lord chancellor. In this court were administered all the great principles of equity jurisprudence. The lord chancellor possessed as one of his titles that of Keeper of the King's Conscience; and, hence, the High Court of Chancery was often called a Court of Conscience. Its procedure did not involve the presence of a jury and it differed from the courts of common law in its mode of proof, mode of trial, and mode of relief. The relief administered was so ample in scope as to be conformable in all cases with the absolute requirements of a conscientious regard for justice. Among the most eminent of the Chancellors of England was Sir Thomas More who laid down his life rather than surrender the Catholic Faith, and Lord Bacon who was the pioneer in broadening the scope of modern learning. After the time when courts became established and entered upon the exercise of their various functions, the common law developed gradually into a more finished system because of the fact that judicial decisions were considered to be an exposition of the common law and, consequently, were the chief repository of the law itself. For this reason the observance of precedents is a marked feature in English jurisprudence and prevails to a much greater extent than under other systems. As the law is deemed to be contained in the decisions of the courts, it necessarily follows that the rule to be observed in any particular proceeding must be found in some prior decision.

When the period of English colonization in America began, the aborigines were found to be wholly uncivilized and, consequently, without any system of jurisprudence, whatsoever. Upon the theory that the English colonists carried with them the entire system of the English law as it existed at the time of their migration from the fatherland, the colonial courts adopted and acted upon the theory that each colony, at the very moment of its inception, was governed by the legal system of England including the juridical principles administered by the common law courts and by the High Court of Chancery. Thus, law and equity came hand in hand to America and have since been the common law of the former English colonies.

When the thirteen American colonies achieved their independence, the English common law, as it existed with its legal and equitable features in the year 1607, was universally held by the courts to be the common law of each of the thirteen states which constituted the new confederated republic known as the United States of America. As the United States have increased in number, either by the admission of new states to the Union carved out of the original undivided territory, or by the extension of territorial area through purchase or contest, the common law as it existed at the close of the War of the American Revolution has been held to be the common law of such new states with the exception that, in the State of Louisiana, the civil law of Rome, which ruled within the vast area originally called Louisiana, has been maintained, subject only to subsequent legislative modifications. The Dominion of Canada is subject to the common law with the exception of the Province of Quebec and the civil laws of that province are derived from the old customary laws of France, particularly the Custom of Paris, in like manner as the laws of the English-speaking provinces are based upon the common law of England. In process of time, the customary laws have been modified or replaced by enactments of the Imperial and Federal parliament and by those of the provincial parliament; they were finally codified in the year 1866 upon the model of the Code Napoléon. However, the criminal law of the Province of Quebec is founded upon that of England and was to a great extent codified by the federal statute of 1892. Practice and procedure in civil causes are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure of the year 1897.

The common law of England is not the basis of the jurisprudence of Scotland; that country having adhered to the civil law as it existed at the time of the union with England except so far as it has been modified by subsequent legislation. The English common law with the exceptions which have been noted prevails throughout the English-speaking world. Mexico, Central America, and South America, with the exception of an English Colony and a Dutch Colony, remain under the sway of the civil law. The common law of England has been the subject of unstinted eulogy and it is, undoubtedly, one of the most splendid embodiments of human genius. It is a source of profound satisfaction to Catholics that it came into being as a definite system and was nurtured, and to a great extent administered, during the first ten centuries of its existence by the clergy of the Catholic Church.

Common law

The ancient law of England based upon societal customs and recognized and enforced by the judgments and decrees of the courts. The general body of statutes and case law that governed England and the American colonies prior to the American Revolution.
The principles and rules of action, embodied in case law rather than legislative enactments, applicable to the government and protection of persons and property that derive their authority from the community customs and traditions that evolved over the centuries as interpreted by judicial tribunals.
A designation used to denote the opposite of statutory, equitable, or civil, for example, a common-law action.
The common-law system prevails in England, the United States, and other countries colonized by England. It is distinct from the civil-law system, which predominates in Europe and in areas colonized by France and Spain. The common-law system is used in all the states of the United States except Louisiana, where French Civil Law combined with English Criminal Law to form a hybrid system. The common-law system is also used in Canada, except in the Province of Quebec, where the French civil-law system prevails.
Anglo-American common law traces its roots to the medieval idea that the law as handed down from the king's courts represented the common custom of the people. It evolved chiefly from three English Crown courts of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: the Exchequer, the King's Bench, and the Common Pleas. These courts eventually assumed jurisdiction over disputes previously decided by local or manorial courts, such as baronial, admiral's (maritime), guild, and forest courts, whose jurisdiction was limited to specific geographic or subject matter areas. Equity courts, which were instituted to provide relief to litigants in cases where common-law relief was unavailable, also merged with common-law courts. This consolidation of jurisdiction over most legal disputes into several courts was the framework for the modern Anglo-American judicial system.
Early common-law procedure was governed by a complex system of Pleading, under which only the offenses specified in authorized writs could be litigated. Complainants were required to satisfy all the specifications of a writ before they were allowed access to a common-law court. This system was replaced in England and in the United States during the mid-1800s. A streamlined, simplified form of pleading, known as Code Pleading or notice pleading, was instituted. Code pleading requires only a plain, factual statement of the dispute by the parties and leaves the determination of issues to the court.
Common-law courts base their decisions on prior judicial pronouncements rather than on legislative enactments. Where a statute governs the dispute, judicial interpretation of that statute determines how the law applies. Common-law judges rely on their predecessors' decisions of actual controversies, rather than on abstract codes or texts, to guide them in applying the law. Common-law judges find the grounds for their decisions in law reports, which contain decisions of past controversies. Under the doctrine of Stare Decisis, common-law judges are obliged to adhere to previously decided cases, or precedents, where the facts are substantially the same. A court's decision is binding authority for similar cases decided by the same court or by lower courts within the same jurisdiction. The decision is not binding on courts of higher rank within that jurisdiction or in other jurisdictions, but it may be considered as persuasive authority.
Because common-law decisions deal with everyday situations as they occur, social changes, inventions, and discoveries make it necessary for judges sometimes to look outside reported decisions for guidance in a case of first impression (previously undetermined legal issue). The common-law system allows judges to look to other jurisdictions or to draw upon past or present judicial experience for analogies to help in making a decision. This flexibility allows common law to deal with changes that lead to unanticipated controversies. At the same time, stare decisis provides certainty, uniformity, and predictability and makes for a stable legal environment.
Under a common-law system, disputes are settled through an adversarial exchange of arguments and evidence. Both parties present their cases before a neutral fact finder, either a judge or a jury. The judge or jury evaluates the evidence, applies the appropriate law to the facts, and renders a judgment in favor of one of the parties. Following the decision, either party may appeal the decision to a higher court. Appellate courts in a common-law system may review only findings of law, not determinations of fact.
Under common law, all citizens, including the highest-ranking officials of the government, are subject to the same set of laws, and the exercise of government power is limited by those laws. The judiciary may review legislation, but only to determine whether it conforms to constitutional requirements.

Tuesday, August 10, 2010

Civil And Common Laws Information

In a criminal case, the government generally brings charges in one of two ways: either by accusing a suspect directly in a "bill of information" or other similar document, or by bringing evidence before a grand jury to allow that body to determine whether the case should proceed. If there is, then the defendant is indicted. In the federal system, a case must be brought before a grand jury for indictment if it is to proceed; some states, however, do not require indictment.
Once charges have been brought, the case is then brought before a petit jury, or is tried by a judge if the defense requests it. The jury is selected from a pool by the prosecution and defense.
The burden of proof is on the prosecution in a criminal trial, which must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The prosecution presents its case first, and may call witnesses and present other evidence against the defendant. After the prosecution rests, the defense may move to dismiss the case if there is insufficient evidence, or present its case and call witnesses. All witnesses may be cross-examined by the opposing side. The defendant is not required to testify under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but must answer the prosecution's questions if he or she takes the stand. After both sides have presented their cases and made closing arguments, the judge gives the jury legal instructions and they adjourn to deliberate in private. The jury must unanimously agree on a verdict of guilty or not guilty.
If a defendant is found guilty, sentencing follows, often at a separate hearing after the prosecution, defense, and court have developed information based on which the judge will craft a sentence. In capital cases, a separate "penalty phase" occurs, in which the jury determines whether to recommend that the death penalty should be imposed. As with the guilt phase, the burden is on the prosecution to prove its case, and the defendant is entitled to take the stand in his or her own defense, and may call witnesses and present evidence.
After sentencing, the defendant may appeal the ruling to a higher court. American appellate courts do not retry the case; they only examine the record of the proceedings in the lower court to determine if errors were made that require a new trial, re-sentencing, or a complete discharge of the defendant, as is mandated by the circumstances. The prosecution may not appeal after an acquittal, although it may appeal under limited circumstances before verdict is rendered, and may also appeal from the sentence itself.

Common Laws on Unlawful Firearm Discharge

The right to gun and firearm use is one of the fundamental rights of all American citizens. However, as with any right there are restrictions that must be followed in order to maintain a peaceful and safe society. While there are many laws and legal restrictions that play a role in firearm restriction, some of the most important are those involving when and where it is legal to discharge a firearm. By understanding what these laws are, you are better aable to protect your rights, freedoms, and interests.
Laws Concerning Firearm Discharge
Throughout the U.S., each state has the ability to set its own laws and restrictions in relation to who may buy a gun, who may sell guns, and when a gun may be used. While states have differing laws, there are some similarities between laws in different states. Some common firearm discharge laws include the following:
  • It is illegal to knowingly discharge a firearm into public
  • It is illegal to knowingly fire a gun on the right of way for a public road, street, or highway
  • It is illegal to knowingly discharge a firearm over a street, highway, road, or building
  • You may perform these acts if you are defending life or property
  • You may perform these acts if it is part of your official duties
  • If you are in an area approved for hunting and you have been personally approved to hunt, you can perform the above activities
If you are found guilty of violating these restrictions, you could face time in jail, probation, hefty fines, and a number of social and professional repercussions. Your ability to work with firearms in the future could also be compromised.

Common Laws on Boating Under the Influence

Boating on a lake, river, or in the ocean can be a very fun and relaxing activity for the whole family. However, it is important to be aware that the act of boating has a number of laws, restrictions and regulations that apply to boat operators similar to the laws influencing the operation of cars and trucks. This includes laws prohibiting the operation of a boating vehicle while intoxicated. Boating under the influence (BUI) and boating while intoxicated (BWI) are serious criminal offenses that can result in serious legal consequences for those accused.
BUI/BWI Laws
No matter what boating craft you are using it is illegal to operate your boat while intoxicated in United States territory. Whether you are canoeing, yachting, boating, or rafting, it is possible to be charged with a BUI or BWI crime. Some common laws to be aware of concerning drinking and boat operation include the following:
  • If you are suspected of boating under the influence you may be asked to pull your boat over and perform some tests to determine your level of intoxication.
  • The same process used on DUI/DWI suspects can be applied to BWI/BUI suspects.
  • You could face field sobriety tests and chemical tests, such as a breathalyzer, to determine your intoxication levels if you are suspected of drunk boating.
  • If you refuse to have your intoxication levels tested you could lose your boating license and general drivers' license for up to one year.
  • If you are convicted of BUI you could face jail time, hefty fines, and probation.
By knowing what laws are associated with drinking and boating you are better able to take measures to protect your freedom and personal well-being. If you are charged with BUI or BWI, it is important that you seek the assistance of a legal professional who will fight for your rights and freedoms in a court of law.

Common Law Marriage - Not So Common

Two people consider themselves to be in a "Common Law Marriage". The couple had a religious ceremony attended by all of their friends and family, lived together for many years, had children together, had joint finances, bought a house, and all of their friends think they are married. Now they want to go their separate ways.
Does this couple need to get a divorce? What about child support, alimony, and property rights?
This situation is an example of what many states consider common law marriage, entitling the couple to a divorce. New York is not one of those states. The couple in our example will not be entitled to a divorce. Instead, they will have to go through a more complicated and uncertain process. And it will have to be done in two separate courts - property issues will be decided in the Supreme Court, and issues involving children will have to be resolved in Family Court.
With regards to property issues, the couple will be treated like 2 business partners that are splitting up. The most significant difference between dissolving this type of a relationship and a marriage is that none of the spouses will be entitled to alimony (since there is no "palimony" in New York).
It should also be noted that the situation remains the same if this were a same-sex couple, who could not have gotten married in the first place.
However, the custodial parent is entitled to child support whether or not the parties were married.
Because there is no common law marriage in New York, it is more difficult for unmarried couples to settle their affairs and resolve their differences after they go their separate ways.

Common Law Marriage in Colorado

Most marriages are statutory; meaning that they are conducted in accordance with laws of the State which are codified in the State's statutes. In Colorado, a statutory marriage requires that the parties be at least 18 years of age, or between 16 and 18 with the consent of the parents, have a marriage license which is given upon a signed application, and within 30 days of obtaining the license, have the marriage solemnized by a person authorized to so such as a judge. A certificate of marriage is then forwarded to the Clerk and Recorder to be registered.
Common law marriage in Colorado does not have the above formalities and is not recognized by any statute. However, case law has recognized that parties can become married simply by their actions, even if they never apply for any marriage license. These actions must show that the parties mutually agreed to a marital relationship. Now usually, the issue of a common law marriage does not come up until one of the parties wants a "divorce" and the other party disagrees that they were ever married. So evidence of a mutual agreement to be married is very important to establishing that a common law marriage exists. In Colorado, there must be conduct showing a mutual public acknowledgment of the marital relationship to establish a common law marriage. The reason for the public display requirement is to guard against fraudulent claims of common law marriage.
Public acknowledgment of the marital relationship can be shown in part by cohabitation, but more is needed; particularly in this day and age where cohabitation is not taboo as it once was. There must be a general understanding or reputation among persons in the community in which the couple lives that the parties hold themselves out as husband and wife. Specific behavior that may be considered includes joint bank and/or credit card accounts held in each other's names; purchase and joint ownership of property; the use of the man's surname by the woman (or vice versa); the use of the man's surname by children born to the parties; and the filing of joint tax returns. There is no specific form that this evidence must take, but rather any evidence to show that the parties openly manifested their desire to be husband and wife will suffice.

Common Law Trademark

The common law trademark is something that was very often used in the past. But with today's commerce going global, a company that has used a trademark for years could find themselves in trouble if they do not officially register it with their government.
When common law is referred to a trademark, this means a company has built up it recognition of a particular product in a geographical area over a long period of time. There is some limited protection under state laws, but it is still advisable to register it with the federal government if a company has a trademark.
With trademarks that are governed by common law, trademark infringements are more difficult to establish. Geographical barriers are usually the reason cited in the many court cases that have been pursued. Another common reason these types of infringement cases are not settled in favor of the one claiming to be the first to use it is what did they actually use? Trademarks can be placed on words, phrases, letters, numbers, and symbols. If there is nothing on file somewhere, who is to say what it actually is? In the past, many common trademarks changed over time or were slightly modified. With no official means to record these changes, no precedent has been made in courts.
Today, trademarks that are non-registered are considered common law trademarks and are designated by the symbol ™. Most commonly registered trademarks are used on interstate commerce items while local products can still use a common law trademark for their products.

Common-Law Marriage in the United States

Common-law marriage is one of those terms that everyone has heard of, but few people actually understand. Because of the nature of modern society, they have become less common than they once were, and now only 11 states and the District of Columbia have provisions for common-law marriages. However, 13 more states recognize such marriages from other states, and consider couples in these relationships to be married (and therefore able to be legally divorced, although this can be a tricky prospect due to the nature of the marriage).
Also called a de facto marriage, these relationships are recognized as marriages even though no legally binding ceremony was performed. At one point in our nation's history, they were quite common amongst pioneers in recently settled areas where there was not necessarily the ability to enter into a traditional, legal marriage. However, because there is no national law governing these marriages, their legality varies from state to state, and though such a relationship may be legally binding in some jurisdictions, they may not be in others.
In order for a relationship to be considered a de facto marriage, several criteria must be met. In general, they are:
  • Both parties in the relationship must consider themselves married. If only one party believes that the relationship constitutes a marriage, then the de facto marriage does not exist.
  • Both parties must be of legal age to be married legally.
  • Both parties must be qualified to be married in other regards as well, namely being unmarried and of sound mind.
  • In many jurisdictions, both parties must hold themselves as married. That means that they must refer to each other as husband and wife, and have been in such a relationship for a considerable amount of time.
If all of these criteria are met, then the couple may be considered to be married, although again only certain states and jurisdictions recognize de facto marriages.
It is also important to understand that while many states may recognize common-law marriages, the IRS does not, and if you are in such a relationship, you will not be able to file as though you were in a regular marriage. If you file taxes as a married couple and you are not, you could be prosecuted for tax fraud.

The Truth About Common Law Marriage

There is a difference between common law marriage and cohabitation. In some cases if you are a cohabitant, you could be considered single and in some cases if you are common law married you are considered married as if you did it the traditional way.
The difference between cohabitation and common law marriage is critical. If you are a cohabitant, you may be legally considered single; if you are common law married, you are legally considered married to the same degree as if you had a ceremony. So, how do you know if you are married in the eyes of the law? Common law marriages are recognized in only certain states, including the District of Columbia, Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas and Utah.
In order to qualify for a common law marriage, you and your partner, in general, must agree either in writing or orally to enter into a husband/wife relationship, hold yourselves out as husband and wife and acquire a reputation as a married couple. The length of time you've cohabitated may play a role in the determination of common law marriage. Common law marriages typically are limited to heterosexual couples.
If you and your partner live in any of the states that recognize common law marriages and do not want the state to consider you as married, you may wish to consult with a lawyer and create a document that would establish your relationship as unmarried cohabitants.

Common Law - Protecting the Natural Rights of People

The Constitution of the United States is a common law document. It describes a Republic designed to uphold the natural rights of the individual citizen and the law of the land. Common Law derives its origin from the first historical human rights declaration, the Magna Carta.
Common law, also known as Natural or Constitutional law, is based on God's law - the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule - "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you". Individuals are free to do as they choose so long as they honor their contracts and do not infringe on the life, liberty or property of someone else.
The Constitution mentions three legal jurisdictions in which courts may operate: Common, Equity and Admiralty or Maritime Law. Common law is applied in civil cases as a means of compensating someone for wrongful acts, known as torts, including both intentional and negligent torts, and resolving contract disputes.
A Common or civil law court is a "Court of Record" whose proceedings are based on centuries of tradition, custom and precedent. It has an independent magistrate and conducts trials by jury. The law is simple to understand and is conveyed in language comprehensible to everyone. Individuals 'present' themselves and their case and counsel is not required to have a license. There must be an injured party to take any action, an individual cannot be 'compelled to perform' and violation of Constitutional law is punishable as a criminal act.
"Statutory Law" came into existence in 1938 when all the top American judges and US attorneys were informed that, since the United States had been declared bankrupt since 1933 and henceforth completely owned by its creditors (International bankers), the Congress, the Executive, the Judiciary and all the State governments were now under the control of these creditors. All courts were instructed to operate under Admiralty law, and would be called 'Statute jurisdiction'. Prior to 1938 the US Supreme Court dealt in Common and Public law. After that date the Supreme Court dealt only with public policy in merchant admiralty law - the law of commerce.
Much of the original US constitutional law has been codified into Federal statute called the Uniform Commercial Code. The U.C.C. is a standardized collection of guidelines that govern the law of commercial transactions. Common/Natural Law is recognized, complementary to, and enforced by the U.C.C.
The U.C.C. provides the individual the mechanism to choose between Constitutional law jurisdiction and Statutory jurisdiction. It also states that failure to make a timely reservation of one's common law rights results in the loss of those rights, which can not be asserted at a later date.
Whenever you sign your name to something, it becomes a contract, and if it has a serial number on it, it becomes a debt to the government. To maintain your rights in common law, writing "without prejudice U.C.C. 1-207" with your signature means you reserve your right not be to compelled to perform under any contract or commercial agreement that was not entered into knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally.
Writing "without prejudice" above your name makes the document inadmissible in a statute law court. It means you do not accept the liability of the compelled benefit of any unrevealed contract or commercial agreement. You retain your rights in common law that governs contracts, which states there must be an injured party. No injury, no case, case closed.

Drug and Device Law

Don't get us wrong. We're delighted to practice drug-and-device law. It's an important, interesting, and dynamic field, and we'd never think of abandoning it. At cocktail parties people gather around and chat with us about the latest mass tort. (We hang out with a nerdy crowd.) By contrast, the ERISA, tax, and structured finance lawyers linger in the corners alone, staring glumly into their chardonnay.

And yet, law school geared us up for a very different array of cases. We were looking forward to helping folks sort out who got to keep the fox carcass. For that matter we figured that animals would figure in lots of our matters: the mouse in the soda bottle, the surprisingly and suddenly pregnant cow, and the sheep pitched overboard in the storm. And we thought we'd be dealing with an even odder menagerie of people, including the hapless lady concussed at the train station and the extraordinarily frisky old guy in Florida. We were even ready to navigate the Rule in Shelley's Case.

Truth be told, if we ever really did encounter those old legal chestnuts, we'd risk serious malpractice, like the William Hurt character in Body Heat. One of our few fond memories of law school is recommending that movie to our trust-and-estate professor because its action hinged on the Rule against Perpetuities. He made the mistakes of taking our advice and taking his wife to the theater. Professor and spouse were both disappointed and astonished by the film's focus on the carnal rather than the legal.

Dang it all, couldn't we please handle some trover and replevin, for old times' sake?

Well, it turns out that we can. We blogged a little more than a year ago about the case of Hunt v. DePuy Orthopaedics, No. 03-900 (RWR), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61644 (D.D.C. July 20, 2009). Plaintiff in that case underwent hip replacement surgery in 1994, and that surgery apparently didn't work out so well. In 1999, Plaintiff underwent a repair surgery during which the original implant was removed. After the 1999 surgery, a DePuy representative received permission to take the original implanted hip device. In 2003, Plaintiff asked for return of the explanted hip. DePuy did not return the hip. Later that year, Plaintiff sued DePuy for breach of express warranty (that the hip would last "25 years to life"), breach of implied warranty, and - ta da! -- replevin.

We don't know why Plaintiff wanted her old artificial hip back. As evidence for the warranty claims? Or maybe it's like when the auto mechanic replaces your fan belt and gives you the old one in a big ziplock bag, just to prove that he really did install a new one. Does anybody keep those old parts?

Plaintiff abandoned (remember that word) her express warranty claim, so the court dismissed it. The federal court then decided that D.C. substantive law on the statute of limitations applied to the implied warranty and replevin claims. The four year statute of limitations for breach of implied warranty began running on the date of the surgery -- January 10, 1994 -- so the 2003 claim on that theory was time-barred.

The statute of limitations for replevin was three years. At first blush then, it looks like the replevin claim was also time-barred. But replevin is an action "brought to recover personal property to which the plaintiff is entitled, that is alleged to have been wrongfully taken or to be in the possession of and wrongfully detained by the defendant." D.C. Code section 16-3701. According to Plaintiff, Defendant "wrongfully detained" the hip starting in 2003, when DePuy declined Plaintiff's request for return of the hip. Thus, the replevin claim eluded the statute of limitations and was the only claim Plaintiff had left.

At this point, Bexis/Herman offered their Solomonic advice to settle the case. No, they didn't suggest that the old hip be sawed in half. They suggested that the defendant either return the explanted hip or tell plaintiff if it no longer existed. Easy-squeezy. That would be that.
But that wasn't that.

Last week the court granted summary judgment on the replevin claim, reasoning that because plaintiff had waited four years to bring her claim, she had effectively abandoned the hip. Hunt v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78536 (D.D.C. August 4, 2010). We'll get to that abandonment theory in a moment. We still have to wonder why Defendant didn't follow our advice. Was it worried about some sort of spoliation? Did it want to hold on to the old hip, the way Philadelphia's fabulous Mutter Museum keeps various medical oddities in display cases and drawers? We just don't know.

Of course, that's a persistent problem with outsiders commenting on legal disputes. Most of the time, we know only what we read in the papers -- or F. Supp. or F.3d -- so we might not be getting the whole story. Anybody who's worked on a litigation and then seen the facts recited in an opinion -- or worse, a newspaper -- knows how much the public story and the reality can diverge. But even if a published opinion has an element of fiction to it, it’s a fiction that we must respect. That, after all, is why tomatoes are vegetables. Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893). So we won't let a little epistemological humility stop us from thinking that our advice for settling the Hunt case should have been followed. (And the advice was free! Hmmm, maybe that's why. After all, you get what you pay for.)

We see the abandonment theory about as often as we see replevin cases. A jury consultant once told us that every drug-and-device case follows the romance novel story of (1) you seduced me, (2) you lied to me, (3) you injured me, and (4) you abandoned me. But that's a different abandonment. Of course it's not that unusual for parties to abandon some legal theories on appeal.

There is statutory abandonment, such as abandonment by a bankruptcy trustee under 11 U.S.C. section 554. There is common law abandonment of a variety of legal interests, such as easements, domiciles, or trademarks. One can also abandon all sorts of real and personal property. Under D.C. law, a party can prove abandonment by demonstrating "both an intent to abandon [isn't it miserable when a definition includes the defined term?] and an act or omission that effectuates the intention." Block v. Fisher, 103 A.2d 575, 576 (D.C. 1954). Here, Plaintiff presented no evidence that when she agreed in 1999 that DePuy could take the old hip it was "her intent that DePuy hold the components for safe-keeping until she requested their return in 2003." Hunt, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78536, *5. During the four years between the surgery and the filing of the lawsuit Plaintiff never asked for return of the hip, never said the possession should be temporary, and never sought assurance of the hip's safekeeping. The only fair inference is that Plaintiff abandoned the property.

It's hard to argue with the D.C. court's conclusion. In fact, we'd like to see the abandonment theory applied to many more cases. There are MDL's where plaintiffs have gone unheard of, or from, for well more than four years. We're only half-serious here, but there is that half. There's something wrong with a mass tort system that allows thousands of plaintiffs to park their cases in the ether, where they go untested for the life of the litigation. It's that sort of thing that quickens our nostalgia for Pierson v. Post or Rose the Second of Aberlone.